Turkey

Turkey’s diverse plant life is protected by the National Biological Diversity Strategy and Action Plan

Turkey ratified the UN Convention on Biological Diversity in 1996, and created a National Biological Diversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) in 2001. The official agency charged with the responsibility of implementing environmental conservation and sustainable development policies is the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF).

Turkey’s ratification of the Convention, the formation of the NBSAP, and subsequent plans have led to concrete steps towards biodiversity conservation. Protected areas such as National Parks and Wildlife Improvement Areas have increased from four to six percent of the national territory since 2000. The Ministry is responsible for protecting 75 endangered mammal species, 415 species of birds, and 106 reptiles, and has successfully protecting many species such as the Turkish Mouflon (Ovis gmelinii anatolica) from extinction (MoEF 2009, 4.1.2). However the Ministry estimates that one only third of the most important areas for plant biodiversity are sufficiently protected.

These rules are especially important because the country is exceptionally rich in plant species, with 8754 known species of vascular plants, 2654 of which are only found in Turkey. Turkey’s natural habitats include sea beaches, steep valleys, expansive steppes, fertile plains and arid, rocky hillsides. The nation’s biodiversity is threatened by land practices such as overgrazing and unsustainable agricultural methods, which have been exacerbated by population increase, deforestation, and land development. It is estimated that eighty percent of Turkey’s land area is suffering from erosion (Guclu, 2004). While the country’s biodiversity is vulnerable, government action on conservation is promising.

Mandatory rules reduced Arabic and Persian influences in the Turkish language

Amidst the sweeping nationalist reforms of Kemal Ataturk’s presidency (1923-1938), he mandated use of the Latin alphabet. Hoping to temper outside influences (notably that of the Arabic and Persian worlds) and to promote Turkey’s independence, Ataturk rapidly phased out the widespread use of Arabic script. The main purpose of these new rules was to remove the perceived “backward” influences of Arabic and Islamic culture, and to create a national language that could keep pace with modern scientific and cultural developments. Ataturk’s policy also began a sustained attempt to remove Arabic and Persian words from citizens’ vocabularies. Geoffrey Wheeler describes the considerable resistance on the part of Turkish people, as many of these words remain deeply ingrained in everyday usage. Nevertheless Turkey developed a unique language that is regulated by the Turkish Language Association.

Traditional customs dictate hairstyles

The way one wears hair in Turkey is not simply an example of individualistic self-expression but rather an extension of pervasive cultural norms. Hair is a powerful symbol in Turkish culture. According to Stanford University anthropologist Carol Delaney, men and women alike are expected to completely remove all body hair. Body hair removal is a particularly common practice right before marriage, but both genders are expected to keep their body clean of hair at all times. The custom has faded to some extent, however, among secular male elites in urban centers.

From about two-years-old onward, men’s hair is typically cut very short and remains that way. This suggests the control required for public life. Only men who complete hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca can grow a long beard if they wish. In fact, during hajj it is customary not to shave or cut hair as a sign of commitment to God; after the journey is complete, it is also customary to shave completely and trim hair as a sign of reintegrating into controlled life.

Delaney notes that, traditionally, women are expected to have long hair, and often leave it uncut from the time a girl begins puberty. School is only obligatory until 5th grade, so while headscarves are forbidden in the secular school system, this is often not a problem for cultural conservatives,. Families abiding by these traditions can simply pull their girls out of school and abide by traditional expectations of female hair length and headscarf usage.

The Industrial Air Pollution Control law of 2004 fails to limit sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants

Legislators have passed air pollution regulations in Turkey, yet so far they have been ineffective in controlling emissions. Turkey passed the Air Quality Protection Regulation in 1986, placing limits on pollutants that negatively impact air quality. In 2004, the Industrial Air Pollution Control set sulfur dioxide (SO2) limit values, yet all ten lignite-fueled plants without flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) systems exceed those limits, and air pollution continues to be a problem (Say, 2005). SO2 distributes regionally, contributing to acid rain, acidifying lakes and streams, damaging trees and sensitive forest soils, and contributing to the decay of buildings, and posing a threat to public health (US EPA, 2007).

Power plants in Turkey are often located near lignite reserves and coincidentally in residential areas or preserved forests (Say, 2005). Flue-gas desulfurization systems can reduce SO2 emissions by 50-98% (US EPA, 2003) by “scrubbing” SO2 from power plant emissions flues, but only three of turkey’s coal-fired plants have these systems (Say, 2005). As a result, despite the 2004 Pollution Control, most of Turkey’s power plants exceed legal limits for SO2 emissions.

Failure to implement environmental regulations is common in Turkey, where a low level of political commitment to environmental issues on the part of the government has produced a situation in which public demand for environmental services goes unmet (Sezer et al., 2003). A 2006 study by Firuz D. Yasamis surveyed national and international experts and concluded that Turkey’s state environmental agencies are ineffective. Sezer et al. (2003) attribute this failure to many factors. The overlapping responsibilities of different agencies make environmental regulation difficult and Turkey’s institutional framework is not sufficient for monitoring and enforcement. Environmental policies regulate “end-of-pipe” remedies for mitigating pollution (such as the SO2 limits set by the 2004 Pollution Control), but fail to encourage environmentally responsible practices during the manufacturing process. Funding for environmental management is inadequate, and economic instruments are applied improperly. For example, a pollution tax was never adjusted for inflation; polluters paying a tax of $2678 in 1988 paid merely $2.30 ten years later.

Rules promoting financial liberalization threaten traditional Turkish bazaars

In the mid-to-late 1980s, Turkey commenced a swift and thorough process of financial liberalization. A law passed in 1980 removed restrictions on foreign investment. Investment in Turkey’s stock and bond markets were facilitated by making it easier to convert the Turkish lira to other currencies and by granting foreign investors access to the Istanbul Stock Exchange.  This made way for the creation of the Turkey Fund, a trust fund encouraging foreign investment in Turkish stock.  The government opened the Turkish Exchange to foreigners in 1989 under favorable conditions: they did not tax dividends or capital gains and lifted restrictions on the securities foreigners could purchase. Prior to the start of this process, the country’s links to international financial markets had been strictly regulated by the state: Turkish citizens and banks were unable to hold foreign currency or invest internationally, and inflows of capital consisted mainly of official lending from international financial institutions and bilateral credit from Western countries (Lukauskas and Minushkin, 2000).

This restructuring of capital inflow has had an immeasurable impact on Turkey, changing, among other things, the nature of Turkish food markets. Large international chain stores such as Migros, Kipa, and Carrefour have moved into large cities, threatening traditional livelihoods. Turkish bazaars—where merchants sell fruits, vegetables, and spcies brought in from rural farms—struggle to stand up to the influx of gargantuan European supermarkets. Many merchants depend on vending at bazaars as their only source of income, but it becomes harder to make a living traditionally as economic development in Turkey continues. Globalization appears in Turkey not only in the guise of superstores like Carrefour but at the bazaars themselves, where among the produce brought in from the countryside one can purchase cheap toys and household supplies made in China (Porter, 2010).

Rules for organic agriculture boost domestic production and protect environmental health

A 1994 law assigned the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) oversight of organic agricultural production in Turkey. MARA subsequently created an Organic Agriculture Committee (OAC), the central decision-making body composed of representatives from different MARA subdivisions. The OAC’s responsibilities include implementing regulation, authorizing organic certification bodies, and improving and promoting organic agriculture. MARA has adapted national legislation on organic farming to European standards and focused on increasing domestic awareness and demand for organic food. The Turkish Association of Organic Agriculture (ETO) is a non-profit organization that provides support to the OAC by offering policy advice, helping to improve organic agricultural techniques, and collaborating on research and training efforts. In 2003, MARA and ETO created a vocational school to provide skilled human resources to the organic agriculture sector and have organized stakeholder workshops with the support of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.

Organic production in Turkey began through contract farming in the mid-1980s as a result of external demand, and subsequently the government institutionalized organic regulations and standards. Responding to demand from other countries for organic produce, individual exporters would contract farmers willing to grow crops organically. Originally, Turkey lacked its own standards for organic agriculture, so production developed according to organic standards of the country to which farmers were exporting. Therefore, organic production methods were dictated primarily by European Union (EU) standards as opposed to Turkish standards. Turkey eventually adopted the European Union definition of organic farming and some of the EU’s regulatory power, effectively playing catch-up to the developed organic food industry (Burrell and Oskam, 2005).

Recently, the Turkish Ministry of the Environment decided to subsidize costs of organic production in specific protected areas.  The Environmental Protection Agency for Special Areas (EPASA) will assume the costs of certification, training and soil analysis in fourteen areas of Turkey under protection. The subsidy was purportedly implemented to protect the natural wealth of these areas and to avoid ecological degradation in addition to developing organic production in general (Hürriyet Daily News).

Consumer practices are shaped by cultural norms of deference to authority and strict adherence to ethical principles

Business ethics in Turkey are a growing concern, as research continues to show that the country is rife with bribery, fraud, corruption, and conscious environmental pollution (Ekin and Tezolmez, 1999). Yet Turkish consumers are actually more idealistic and rule-abiding than their American counterparts (Rawwas et al. 2005). The people of Turkey often approach ethics by judging the appropriateness of actions measured according to widely understood principles of right and wrong. This approach is in opposition to an ethics concerned more with consequences, which is more prevalent in the United States (Hofstede et al., 1991). In addition, according to Mohammed Rawwas, Turkish citizens are more likely to rely on authority figures to lay out plans and subsequent rules and to judge ideas in ‘black and white’ terms (Rawwas, 2001).

This carries important implications for Turkish policy-makers and foreign advisors. Mohammed Rawwas suggests that Turkish citizens are more likely to attempt to be in complete compliance with laws and regulations, but only as long as these rules are very clear and disseminated to the public. He suggests it is important for there to be frequent reminders of rules and regulations.

Rule and norms ensure the dominance of secular practices and western clothing

The secularization of the state – separating the institutions of government from any organized religion – under the Ataturk regime gave rise to secular Republican elites and self proclaimed ‘progressive Kemalist intellectuals.’ Led by the Kemalist secular elites, Turkish secularism has meant similar things to what it has in France—the banning of religious traditions in the public sphere and of religious institutions in the government. Turkey adopted a western-style civil law system, abolishing religious law and courts in 1926 and officially self-identified as a secular state in 1936 after a constitutional amendment. Turkey outlawed Arabic and Persian languages in the centralized secular education system, replacing Arabic script with Latin script, teaching Turkish and a select set of western languages.

The status of Western clothing and choices that go along with a secular image help define social classes in Turkish society. Thus, when someone does choose to publicly display their Islamic allegiances (through clothing, for example), this is perhaps stronger and more suggestive than in other parts of the Arab world, for it expresses not only an adherence to traditional Islamic values but also implies a critique of the modern values espoused by secular elites: permissiveness, consumerism, pollution, corruption and nationalism are all rejected by the modern Islamist elites. The veiling of women in the late 20th century is an outward rejection of secularism and shows the extent of re-Islamization in Turkey.

There is substantial animosity between secular and Islamist elites; over the last 130 years, Turkey has been slowly but continually transforming into a more secular and westernized society, much to the chagrin of the Islamists. Turkish political society is extremely open and democratic compared to its Islamic neighbors in the Middle East. The Islamist party has been a a functioning part of the political system since 1970.

According to Nilüfer Göle, professor of sociology at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, there is a new Islamist model developing in Turkey in opposition to the secular system. These new elites are giving rising members of society a different way to express themselves, offering a hybrid of Islam and secular modern education. They have the institutional, professional, and academic resources to make change and an Islamic philosophy that challenges secularism (Göle 1997).

The civil code of 1926, which established women’s legal rights, still shapes the role of women today

The civil code of 1926 abolished polygamy and gave women equal legal rights. Women are encouraged to attend universities, run businesses, run for public offices, and aid in the progress of the Turkish nation. These reforms were put in place by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish state, but were not necessarily in line with the wishes of the public at large. Furthermore, the reforms were part of a larger secularizing force that meant women’s expanded rights were contingent upon their westernization as well; traditional clothing and veiling of the head was seen as primitive and uncivilized. Likewise the Turkish government expect women to raise their children using western science and medicine.

Turkish state feminism is concerned more with the public life of women, while what happens in the home has remained largely outside of state affairs. Thus, equal representation and professional opportunity have been stressed by the government, but empowerment as equals in marriage have not. Because women’s rights did not come about as a result of public demand for equality, in social settings men and women are still far from equal. Women are expected to downplay their sexuality and femininity in public, and traditional family values are still dominant. So the expectations that women should be influential in the public realm often comes as a burden to women given the traditional demands of running the family. Arranged marriages are still a cultural norm, although not as dominant as in the early 20th century.
More socially liberal visions of women have been introduced and have blossomed in the last thirty years, but the history and institutionalization of feminism as a state practice will likely always shape the way women are viewed and the expectations that are placed upon them by Turkish society.

The absence of a national land use policy hinders sustainability in the built environment

Turkey is among one of the largest countries on earth in terms of land area. In recent decades, accelerated migration, population growth, urbanization, and industrialization have increased the detrimental effects of poor land use on the nation’s natural environment. Turkish land use planning is neither comprehensive nor precise, and has become a source of many environmental problems.

While some regions of the country have institutionalized land use models, there is no national-level policy, uniform regulation, or encoded regulation process. Although the 1982 Constitution appoints the state as responsible for the “protection and efficient operation of land” and the planning of “economic, social and cultural development and efficient use of national resources” (Articles 44, 45, and 166), there are few specific rules guiding land development, evaluation, and management.

Without a national law governing land use, complications arise about which agencies are responsible for land use planning. The Ministry of Agriculture, General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and other state departments have ambiguous authority concerning land management. Without a clear set of rules, it is difficult to detect misuse of lands: buildings may be built in forests, factories may be found on productive agricultural lands, and industrial development may occur in ecologically sensitive areas. The policy initiatives that do take place on local levels lack national support, because there is no national rhetoric or standard surrounding these practices. Land is therefore perceived as something that is not highly managed or controlled by the state, and this has influenced how Turks view the responsibility of developers to manage land in an environmentally friendly way.

Insecure Property Rights Threaten Traditional Urban Agriculture

Garden plots have provided fresh produce to urban neighborhoods in Istanbul for centuries, operating through local organizations known as bostans. Their origin dates at least as far back as the Byzantine period, and accelerated in 1453 when Sultan Mehmed the Conquerer brought 30,000 farmers to live in villages at the outskirts of Constantinople as part of his effort to rebuild the city. Vegetables produced in bostans were sold in wholesale and retail markets to feed urban residents and different neighborhoods were known for their specialty crops. There are still an estimated 1,000 bostans across the city. But today the master gardeners and organized guilds once held in high esteem are experiencing the loss of their land, pushed into the margins of urban space and society. According to Paul Kaldiian, the principle threat is insecure property rights, which makes farmers susceptible to land grabs amid pressure for urban expansion. “Very few gardeners have title to their land. Almost all of them cultivate land of which ownership is contested or which has been zoned as off limits to development.” Absent clear rules specifying who has the right to use a given parcel of land, farmers are hesitant to invest in capital improvements. The problem is exacerbated by the infiltration of western-style markets, which have been accompanied by myths that bostans are marginal, inefficient, or unhygienic, in contrast to supermarkets that are portrayed in the media as modern and efficient urban ideals. The loss of bostans is leading to the paving over of Istanbul’s productive green spaces.

Since the 1980s, however, social scientists and reformers have become increasingly interested in urban agriculture as a viable alternative that supports community-building, preservation of cultural traditions, and sustainable development. Paul Kaldjian argues that the loss of bostans is not inevitable, and that in fact they should be used as an active and relevant model for present and future sustainable food production in Istanbul. An example of this already in practice is Turkey’s first official urban agriculture project, started in early 2004. It is coordinated by one of Turkey’s prominent NGOs, UYD (Ulasilabilir Yasam Derngi, Accessible Life Association). The project’s mission is to support and train poor unemployed women in agricultural activities and to ensure that the activities continue in the future. In June of 2005, Istanbul signed the United Nations Environment Programme’s Urban Environmental Accords (also known as the “Green Cities Declaration”). Istanbul’s bostans are considered exemplary projects under the terms of the accord. In contrast to many cities that are exploring new greening methods or reinventing urban agriculture, Istanbul benefits from existing opportunities to “merge traditional values with contemporary demands and possibilities. Bostans are at the center of that opportunity” (Kava 2005).

Meat sold here is affected by pasture law of 1988

In order to combat problems of agricultural land scarcity in the face of population growth and urbanization, Turkish officials passed a Pasture Law in 1998. Since the mid-20th century, government-owned pastureland that provides grazing space for animals has been converted to other uses to meet new needs. However, the simultaneous increase in population has led to a heightened demand for animal products, and the lands devoted to feed animals have been increasingly overgrazed.

While Atsuvuki Asami argues that tenuous property rights and land registry laws are to blame, the process of “pasture attack” also provides a constant threat of annexation of these public lands, as farmers dismiss seemingly arbitrary lines that attempt to distinguish between public and private land. The difficulty of monitoring and restricting overuse and encroachment are part of the limited effectiveness of the law, which was designed to:

1) mark the border between private cropland and government pasture more clearly
2) confiscate the land people have already intruded on
3) carry out the project for improving the pastures’ grass quality, which has included subsidizing fertilizer and grass seeds for shepherds and farmers
4) assign the right to the marked government pasture to the local village community

Asami finds that the law was well designed and economically efficient. Through institutionalizing a system of rotational grazing to ensure sustainability and localizing control over the commons, the state is able to use the threats of confiscation and litigation as a disincentive for further “pasture attack,” though he notes that anything raising land values will make reclaiming the public land that much more difficult.