Prepared by Dalar Nazari, Daniel O’Neil, Sara Sholes, and Paul Steinberg
Photo credit: claudiolara on Flickr
Democracy is affecting this cement
The amount of asbestos in cement produced and used in Brazil is limited because major changes in labor laws have allowed unions to advocate for asbestos-free products.
There are about 3,000 manufactured products in Brazil containing asbestos, including cement. These products are harmful to consumers and dangerous for workers in factories that produce them. Prior to the 1980s there was no regulation on asbestos-containing products in Brazil, but today the exposure limit of asbestos is comparable to that of the United States.
Regulations did not exist until the 1980s because trade unions and social movements did not have the authority to express themselves under military rule. The 1943 Consolidation of the Labor Laws code, created by a fascist-influenced regime, required that unions register and receive approval at the Ministry of Labor. The government had the right to intervene in the unions and replace their leaders. Unions that went on strike without authorization by the Labor Courts were subject to severe penalties. The military coup of March 1964 loosened the government’s grip on unions, but this still took place within the context of an authoritarian regime.
Since the arrival of democracy in 1989, unions operate freely and have the right to contest the constitutionality of any act of government in the Supreme Court. This has translated into greater worker influence over environmental health and safety standards. In 1991, the official workplace exposure limit for asbestos in Brazil was 4 fibers/cm3, and after the Brazilian federal government ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 162, the limit was reduced to 2.0 fibers/cm3. Soon the leading unions in Brazil started pushing the government to eliminate asbestos altogether. Although asbestos is not yet banned, cement industry employers have signed a national agreement with workers’ representatives to reduce asbestos exposure.
Edward J. Amadeo and Jose Marcio Camargo. 1993. Labour Legislation and Institutional Aspects of the Brazilian Labour Market. LABOUR 7 (1):157–80; and Fernanda Giannasi and Paulo Gilvane Lopes Pena. 2003. Asbestos in Brazil. Available at www.abrea.com.br/enpenadresden.pdf Asbestos European Conference, accessed 06 December 2010.
The National Electricity Conservation Program improves building energy efficiency
Buildings and appliances often meet the requirements for a National Electricity Conservation Program (PROCEL) energy efficiency label. The Brazilian government established this voluntary program in 1985 to help utility companies conserve energy. In the 1970s and 1980s, utility companies faced severe financial problems. Decades of economic instability and inflation had discouraged long term investments, and utility companies could not handle the sudden increase in electricity consumption through greater supply alone. With help from PROCEL, they began working toward increased energy efficiency. A project review and impact analysis estimated that by 1996, PROCEL had saved about 2,360 gigawatts per year of electricity.
In 2003, PROCEL launched the Regulation for Energy Efficiency Labeling of Commercial Buildings. The regulations are voluntary because in Brazil, lighting and heating/cooling systems for small structures are usually installed after the building is ready to be occupied. This practice makes it difficult to mandate a minimum energy standard. However, by working directly with the private sector, the Brazilian government has made great strides towards energy conservation.
Howard Geller, Gilberto de Martino Jannuzzi, Roberto Schaeffer and Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim (1998) The Efficient Use of Electricity in Brazil: Progress and Opportunities, Energy Policy 26 (11):859-72; and R. Lambert, F. Westphal, J. Carlo and S. Goulart, Regulation for Energy Efficiency Labeling of Commercial Buildings in Brazil, 2nd PALENC Conference and 28th AIVC Conference on Building Low Energy Cooling and Advanced Ventilation Technologies in the 21st Century, September 2007, Crete island, Greece. www.inive.org/members_area/medias/…/
PalencAIVC2007_V2_002.pdf? Accessed 7/15/13.
Transgenic cotton in this shirt is regulated by the Biosafety Law
Research and development of genetically engineered varieties of cotton in Brazil must abide by at least three sets of regulations: the Biosafety Law, the Pesticide Law, and CONAMA Resolution 305. This ensures that transgenic plants (plants in which the DNA is manipulated in laboratory settings to promote desired traits) are safe for production and consumption.
In 1995, the Biosafety Law (law no. 8974/95) was passed, linking together all preexisting regulatory structures regarding biosafety. It requires organizations that create genetically modified organisms to establish an institutional biosafety commission. It is the job of the National Technical Commission on Biosafety (CTNBio) within the Ministry of Science and Technology to educate and regulate the commissions. CTNBio is also responsible for developing biosafety policies, determining risk levels, and performing environmental studies on transgenic crops.
From 1995 to 2002, CTNBio certified 165 institutions, most commonly the local Brazilian offices of large multinational companies. These companies import transgenic seeds and backcross them with Brazilian varieties. Because the biosafety commission members are usually not Brazilian natives, it is important that they be trained in the fundamentals of the Brazilian biosafety framework.
Eliana Fontes (2003) Legal and Regulatory Concerns of Transgenic Plants in Brazil, Journal of Invertebrate Pathology 83 (2):100-103.
Resolution 257/99 limits heavy metals in this watch battery
Brazil’s National Council on the Environment (CONAMA) passed resolution No. 257 in 1999, specifying that batteries like the one used in this watch must be recycled and may contain only a limited amount of toxic heavy metals such as lead, cadmium, and mercury. According to Espinosa and colleagues, this social rule – the first of its kind in Latin America – is too weak because most batteries already meet its content limits and it does not address how the heavy metals are used.
The resolution is poorly implemented because there is no systematic method to collect and recycle batteries. Some firms that sell batteries already have an organized system for recycling. For example, Nokia and Motorola collect used batteries at the outlets that sell batteries and ship them abroad to be recycled. However, for recycling to work, consumers are expected to trade in their used batteries when they buy new ones. It is particularly important to recycle batteries that do not meet the standards, such as nickel cadmium batteries. These batteries must be recycled and the offender will be punished with 1 to 4 years in prison and a fine if caught improperly disposing of them, according to the Federal Environmental Crime Law 9605. Yet a study in the Municipality of Sao Paulo shows that the majority of the population does not know about the rules governing batteries or the types of batteries installed in their everyday products.
Although Resolution 257/99 is a step in the right direction, absent clear rules and public education, it has not resulted in drastic changes in battery recycling practices in Brazil.
Denise Crocce Romano Espinosa, Andréa Moura Bernardes, and Jorge Alberto Soares Tenório (2004) Brazilian Policy on Battery Disposal and Its Practical Effects on Battery Recycling, Journal of Power Sources 137 (1):134-39.
Petrochemicals used in this helmet meet International Organization of Standardization rules
Companies in Brazil now compete in the international market, so the production process of most petrochemicals used to make products like bicycle helmets are certified by social rules like ISO 9001 and ISO 14001. These are International Organization of Standardization rules that deal with quality and environmental management, respectively. These companies stress that they must now demonstrate that they are responsible and safety conscious if they want to be a part of the international market.
This pressure to meet international trade standards is new to Brazil. When the country started the industrialization process after World War I, it restricted foreign imports and invested strongly in domestic infrastructure. After 1964, the military government further reinforced a centralized, inward-looking model of economic development, resulting in great income inequality and little foreign exchange. In the 1980s, in order to stabilize the economy, Brazil denationalized state-owned industries. The privatization of state companies, the increase in international competition, and the creation of new environmental regulations (bolstered by the growth of environmental concern both within Brazil and abroad) have resulted in more environmentally proactive petrochemical companies.
Francisco Cavalcanti Sá Aberu, Claire Barlow, José Carlos Lázaro Silva Filho and Francisco Assis Soares (2010) Structural Reform and Environmental Proactivity: The Case of Brazilian Companies, RAM, Revista de Administração Mackenzie (Online) 11 (4):154-77.
The National Water Act of 1997 defines this water as a public resource
Water in Brazil is considered a public resource and is managed locally under a system established by the National Water Act of 1997. Brazil uses a nested institutional design, with the National Water Resources Council at the top, proceeding downward to State Water Resources Councils, River Basin Agencies, and River Basin Committees. This localized system is necessary because Brazil is so large that its various regions have quite distinct water needs.In the 1980s, policy reformers realized that the water sector needed to be revamped. These concerns are reflected in the Constitution approved in 1988 after Brazil transitioned to a democracy. Section 21 of the Constitution identifies water as public resource to be administrated by the government on behalf of the people, and it divides the management of water between the federal and state governments. To lay the groundwork for passage of the National Water Act, between 1991 and 1996 numerous workshops were convened nationwide with political leaders, water professionals, water users, nongovernmental organizations, and local communities.
The National Water Act is guided by the following principles: water is a public good; water is a finite resource and has an economic value; water will be managed for multiple uses, but with a priority on meeting people’s basic needs; the river basin is the appropriate unit for water management; and water management shall be decentralized with the participation of government, stakeholders and society. It remains to be seen how effective this new set of rules will be in providing safe, sustainable water for Brazil.
Monica Porto and Jerson Kelman (2000) Water Resources Policy in Brazil, Rivers – Studies in the Science Environmental Policy and Law of Instream Flow 7 (3) (online).
See also: Rebecca Neaera Abers and Margaret E. Keck (2009) Mobilizing the State: The Erratic Partner in Brazil’s Participatory Water Policy, Politics & Society 37: 289-314.
Much of rural Brazil also has lighting due to The “Light for All” program
The “Luz Para Todos” (Light for All) program in Brazil is an attempt to rectify earlier policies that left much of the rural population without electricity.
As Brazil became richer and its population grew, the demand for energy increased. From 1975 to 2000, energy use in Brazil increased by 250%. Like other rapidly developing economies, Brazil invested in modern energy sources to meet this demand. However, economic modernization left the rural population behind. A disproportionate amount of rural electricity comes from small hydropower plants, leaving rural people vulnerable to drought.
In 2003 the Light for All program was launched to provide universal access to electricity while improving electricity sources. The program has extended the grid to rural areas and mandated that isolated communities develop local renewable sources of power like biofuel, wind, and solar. The federal government supplies much of the initial capital required for development. Pereira et al. report that between 1991 and 2008 the coverage rate in rural areas increased from 49% to 97%.
Howard Geller, Roberto Schaeffer, Alexandre Szklo, and Mauricio Tolmasquim (2004) Policies for Advancing Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Use in Brazil, Energy Policy 32: 1437-50; and Marcio Pereira, Marcos Freitas, and Neilton da Silva (2009) Rural Electrification and Energy Poverty: Empirical Evidences [sic] from Brazil, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 14(4): 1229-40.
Ordinance No. 143 mandates biofuel use
All cars in Brazil run on a mixture of ethanol and gasoline. Created in 2007, Ordinance No. 143 mandates that all light vehicle fuels consist of at least 25% ethanol. This rule is a continuation of concerted policy choices by the Brazilian governments of the past 40 years to increase ethanol production for use as fuel.
Although there have been government investments in ethanol since the 1920s, it was not until the oil crisis of the 1970s that energy independence from foreign oil became a priority. The military dictatorship recognized that the high cost of gasoline, sporadic supply, and reliance upon the whims of other countries threatened their ability to rule. Gasoline comprised almost all vehicle fuel at the time and 90% of this was imported. To secure a reliable fuel source, the government launched Proalcool in 1975, which used quotas, price controls, and other state interventions to stimulate ethanol production from sugar cane biomass. The program was expanded after the second oil crisis in 1979 to include tax credits for purchasing vehicles equipped to run on only ethanol.
Ethanol use is currently encouraged by taxing gasoline at 52%. Because there are no price controls on ethanol, however, when the price reaches near parity with gasoline, consumers tend to shift to higher gasoline content because gasoline contains more energy per liter. This leads to consumer uncertainty regarding the economic benefits of buying an ethanol-powered car. As world demand for biofuels increases, it will be interesting to see what kind of institutional frameworks Brazil creates to ensure sufficient production to meet domestic demand while still promoting exports, which account for so much of its growing economy.
Joao Martines-Filho, Heloisa L. Burnquist, and Carlos E. F. Vian (2006) Bioenergy and the Rise of Sugarcane-Based Ethanol in Brazil, Choices 21 (2): 91-96.
This man’s environmental rights are protected by the Ministério Público
Article 129 of the Brazilian Constitution charges public prosecutors with the task of “protect[ing] public and social patrimony, the environment and other diffuse interests.” The citizens of most presidential republics are familiar with the tripartite division of the federal government into the judiciary, legislature, and executive. In Brazil, however, public prosecutors of the Ministério Público (MP) have a greatly expanded role and essentially act as a separate branch of government. They have forced the government to pay more attention to environmental issues.
The MP has a constitutionally set budget. Its prosecutors are chosen by a civil service exam and are promoted by internal mechanisms. Only the head of the MP is appointed by the president and this person must be chosen from within the ministry. This has the effect of insulating the MP from political pressure. Unlike most other justice departments, the MP is not called upon to represent the government in suits, nor is it merely limited to prosecuting violators of federal laws; rather its mission is to defend the “diffuse and collective interests” of society from the government, corporations, and individuals. Its primary tool is “public civil action” (ação civil pública), which gives it the jurisdiction to “take to court any person or entity for harm done to the environment, consumer rights, or the artistic, cultural, historical, tourist, and landscape patrimony of the nation.”
The prestige and relatively high salaries draw many talented young attorneys to the MP. This creates a highly skilled and socially active agency. The agency sees itself as “defending the weak and defenseless” and takes a very active role in protecting the environment from polluting businesses as well as other agency of the government. Given its powers, Brazilian citizens tend to pursue environmental protection through the MP rather than through individual civil suits as in the United States or through legislation as in Europe.
Bernardo Mueller (2010) The Fiscal Imperative and the Role of Public Prosecutors in Brazilian Environmental Policy, Law & Policy 32 (1): 104-26.
This garbage will not be mixed with construction waste due to resolution 307
In 2002, Brazil’s environment agency (CONAMA) passed Resolution 307, creating more stringent standards for the disposal of household waste and waste from construction and demolition (C&D).
Standards regarding waste management in Brazil were first developed during the 1980s but were largely unsuccessful. As recently as 2004, it was estimated that no more than 20% of counties in Brazil sent their waste to sanitary landfills, instead often using lixões, or illegal open dumps that have not been designed to prevent environmental harm. In 2007, Nunes and colleagues reported “Only eleven (0.2%) of the 5,507 Brazilian municipalities have C&D waste recycling centres.” The national government has recently become more serious about making progress on both fronts.
Resolution 307, which went into effect in 2004, made it illegal to discard sanitary and C&D waste in the same dump. The resolution requires that any building project must submit a plan outlining the methods of waste disposal. The rule also requires companies to sort waste and outlines different methods of disposal for each. The municipal government of São Paulo has been at the forefront of efforts to reduce waste. Its Decree 37.952/99 requires that contractors obtain a document from a transfer station showing that the waste has been properly disposed. These efforts provide a model for cities like Rio to follow.
Raul Petter and José Cortina (2009) The Current Situation of Sanitary Landfills in Brazil and the Importance of the Application of Economic Models, Waste Management & Research 27: 1002-5; and Vanderley John, Sérgio Angulo, Leonardo Miranda, Vahan Agopyan, and Francisco Vasconcellos, Strategies for Innovation in Construction Demolition Waste Management in Brazil, CIB World Building Congress, Toronto, Canada, 2004.
This bike path was developed as part of Rio Orla urban planning project
Rio de Janeiro’s Rio Orla urban planning project established many of the 84 km of bike lanes throughout the city. Rio faces many obstacles in developing the infrastructure for bicycle transportation. Much of the city lacks sidewalks or streets that can be easily converted into bicycle lanes, and inadequate funding has halted the construction of several bicycle paths. New urban infrastructure that ignores bicycling hinders these efforts because adding bike paths after the fact would require tearing down newly constructed road and sidewalk. Moreover, Sirkis argues that the aggressive driving habits of drivers in Rio necessitates physical barriers between bike lanes and streets to prevent accidents.
Despite these challenges, joint efforts by government officials and citizen groups facilitated implementation of the Rio Orla project. Pressure from Brazil’s Green Party and NGOs helped to secure official support at the city level. The project was overseen by the municipal environmental department, which in 1993 created the Working Group for Cycle Systems (modeled on the Dutch group ENFB) to provide a forum for discussion and planning. This group included members of several municipal departments and received input from bicycling members of the public to inform their decisions.1
To build support for Rio Orla, the environment department began the project in a central location connecting the shore and downtown, which gave the movement publicity and helped to establish bicycle transport as a viable alternative. Demonstrations such as Tuesday Night Bikers, which closed streets for thousands of bikers every Tuesday night, also helped to raise public awareness and build support for the project.
Alfredo Sirkis (2000) Bike Networking in Rio: The Challenges for Non-motorized Transport in an Automobile-dominated Government Culture, Local Environment 5 (1): 83-95.
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